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Planned Residential Developments Before
and After the Pennsylvania PRD Statute
I. Introduction
The Planned Residential Development (PRD),I represents a move-
ment away from rigid, conventional zoning to a more flexible plan for land
use. The area zoned as a PRD is usually a sizeable tract of land that is to be
developed as a unit by one developer. The entire unit, rather than "lots"
within the tract, must meet zoning requirements, often given in terms of
percentages of land that must be devoted to open space, dwelling units, and
compatible commercial or industrial establishments. Within the general
confines of these requirements the developer is permitted to arrange the
community in any manner approved by local officials, clustering dwellings
and preserving open space if desired.
The latitude afforded developers by the PRD concept2 is a significant
and progressive departure from the restrictions of traditional zoning, under
which special "subdivision" ordinances control the division of a large
tract into smaller tracts, specifying minimum lot size and other factors,
3
and requiring each new lot to comply individually with all applicable
1. The Planned Unit Development (PUD) is an older term synonymous with the PRD.
PRD places emphasis semantically upon the residential aspect of planned developments, but
the new term has not altered the planned development concept enunciated as a PUD. PRD is
used throughout this comment for the sake of uniformity, even though many of the authorities
cited will refer to the older term.
2. The first statutory provision for a PRD was in Section 12 of the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act that was drawn up in 1926 under the auspices of President Hoover's Department
of Commerce. Edward M. Bassett, Frank B. Williams, and Alfred Bettman, distinguished
zoning attorneys, were responsible for drafting most of the Act. Adopted at one point by all
fifty states, it remains in effect in forty-seven states, although the provisions for planned unit
residential developments is largely overlooked. Kentucky, Vermont, and Pennsylvania have
repealed the Standard Act and adopted different statutes. Washington has retained the Act
but adopted an optional municipal code. The Standard Act is treated extensively in 1 N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 18 (1974). Since 1926 the PRD has been
variously defined by courts and legislative bodies. The OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 519.021
(Supp. 1972) states: "As used in this section, 'planned unit development' means a develop-
ment which is planned to integrate residential use with collateral uses, and in which lot size,
setback lines, yard areas, and dwelling types may be varied and modified to achieve particular
design objectives and make provisions for open spaces, common areas, utilities, public
improvements, and collateral non-residential uses." Another definition is, "a planned unit
development might be described as a tract of land absolved from conventional zoning to
permit clustering of residential uses and perhaps compatible commercial and industrial uses,
and permitting structures of differing heights." Orinda Homeowners' Comm. v. Board of
Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 772, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970).
3. Local ordinances also prescribe setback lines, side- and rear-yard specifications,
building height, type and size of out buildings, lot coverage or floor area ratios, and open
space.
zoning ordinances. In traditional zoning, the type and density4 of dwellings
are restricted with respect to lot location within the community. The
intended result of traditional zoning, a carefully structured community
segregated according to residential, commercial, or industrial land use and
regulated through restrictions on building height and population density,5
stands in stark contrast to the flexibility intended in PRDs.
Despite its advantages over traditional "Euclidean" zoning, the PRD
concept has met with great opposition, yet this opposition is no greater than
that met by the earliest Euclidean zoning proposals of the 1920's, when the
status quo was unrestricted land use and Euclidean zoning was an innova-
tive approach. Ironically, the status quo with which the PRD must contend
is that of Euclidean zoning. Yet most official furor has quieted, and many
states have adopted PRD statutes. This comment examines the process that
led to legislative sponsorship of the PRD, reviews significant challenges to
the concept, and discusses Pennsylvania's PRD statute and cases decided
thereunder. The starting point of this discussion, however, is an examina-
tion of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 the case that served as the
foundation for development and testing of zoning principles. An under-
standing of the evolution and rationale of this decision is essential in a
review of the resistance to the PRD.
II. Euclidean Zoning: Innovative Necessity to "Cookie-Cutter"
In Euclid, the first Supreme Court case on zoning, the power of state
and local officials to zone land by districts on the basis of use was upheld in
the face of constitutional challenges 7 as an "aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare." 8 Essentially, district zoning was a
positive extension of earlier attempts at "negative zoning," i.e., the
elimination of dangerous uses and nuisances.
9
4. Density policy is an important area of planning and zoning. Setting, implementing,
and enforcing density regulations is complicated. General systems of density regulation
divide into population measures or bulk measures. Population measures are by persons,
persons capacity (of buildings), persons per room, families, or family capacity (or dwelling
units). Bulk measures are by coverage and height, floor area ratio, cubage, or rooms. A
complete discussion of these methods, their impact and value, can be found in I N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 34 (1974).
5. Euclidean zoning tends to homogenize neighborhoods socially within communities.
Increasingly, senior and single citizens cannot afford or do not desire single lot residences.
Economic factors that isolate the rich from the poor under zoning restrictions are a usual
subject for comment [for collection and discussion of related cases see Note, Zoning:
Permissible Purposes, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 202, 204-07 (1950)], but stratification by age is
seldom considered. Yet, it may have greater impact upon the society as a whole. Whether or
not this homogenization is desirable may be a matter of personal opinion, but it must be
recognized as a result of perpetuating the Euclidean system. Otherwise, zoning techniques
will not reflect the needs and opinions of the community. See also Williams, Planning Law
and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317 (1955).
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Euclid].
7. The suit was brought by an owner of unimproved land within the corporate limits of
the village, who sought relief upon the ground that the building restrictions imposed by the
ordinance operated to reduce the normal value of his property and to deprive him of liberty
and property without due process of law.
8. 272 U.S. at 387.
9. J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 16 (1930).
The Village of Euclid, a Cleveland suburb, enacted zoning ordinances
to "relegate industrial establishments to localities separated from residen-
tial sections." 10 In upholding the validity of these ordinances, which
created and maintained residential districts from which "business and
trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses," 1 were
excluded, the Court relied upon the nuisance theory:
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind . . . like the question whether a
particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined. . . by consid-
ering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality. A
nuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong place,-like a pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard. 2
State courts had previously recognized that the exclusion of business
buildings from residential districts "bears a rational relation to the health
and safety of the community." 3 By affirming the general propositions of
"local definition of nuisance" and "rational relation to health and safety,"
the Court in Euclid validated both district zoning and local autonomy in
zoning classification. These two concepts are central to the process of
zoning, and have been consistently relied upon by the courts in finding
specific zoning plans valid. Although in its narrow holding Euclid merely
affirmed the validity of a particular zoning plan proposed by the local
officials of the Village of Euclid, the term "Euclidean zoning" has since
evolved to describe a rigid, restricted approach to zoning by districts in
which the use, height, and occupancy of buildings are predetermined
according to a comprehensive plan'4 for community development. The
10. 272 U.S. at 389-90.
11. Id. at 390.
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id. at 391.
14. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed.
1926). The Act required that all zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," a
requirement that has been variously interpreted by the courts. Some courts have held that the
comprehensive plan requirement is merely a restatement of the standard requirements under
the police power that regulations must promote the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.
Nani v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 104 R.I. 150, 242 A.2d 403 (1968); Hadley v. Harold Realty
Co., 97 R.I. 403,198 A.2d 149 (1964); Nowicki v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 148 Conn. 492, 172
A.2d 386 (1961); Huff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957). Alabama
courts advanced the interpretation that the comprehensive plan requires that zoning cover a
full geographic area; ordinances covering a smaller area rather than the whole city were
invalid. Chapman v. City of Troy, 241 Ala. 637, 4 So. 2d 1 (1941); Johnson v. City of
Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So. 2d 342 (1947). Other courts have defined the comprehensive
plan negatively, indicating that it is not the "master plan" envisioned by the Planning
Enabling Act but is, instead, the plan underlying the regulations. Kozesnik v. Twp. of
Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); Levinsky v. Zoning Comm'n, 144 Conn. 117, 127
A.2d 822 (1956); Miller v. Town Planning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 265, 113 A.2d 504 (1955)
(holding that the comprehensive plan is found in the zoning regulations themselves). Zoning
changes that have been given serious consideration, subjected to a rational process, have also
been accepted as satisfying the comprehensive plan. Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery,
supra; Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J. Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46 (1956). A thorough
discussion of the comprehensive plan can be found in I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW § 25 (1974) and J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 129 (1930). For an
explanation of the "master plan" see Haar, The MasterPlan: An Impermanent Constitution,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353. See also Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68
focus in Euclidean zoning is upon the individual lot, and in residential
districts, population density is controlled in relation to lot size.15 Thus the
connotations of Euclidean zoning as presently understood are expanded
beyond the limited holding in Euclid. To understand why this expansion
occurred, one must view Euclid in the perspective of its own time.
The Euclid decision did more than generally recognize the necessity
of zoning to secure order in a rapidly industrializing culture. It also
reflected attitudes based upon conditions peculiar to the 1920's. 16 Apart-
ment houses were considered a "business use" and, because of their
enormous height and bulk, were regarded as undesirable for residential
districts. 7 The Court approved the Village of Euclid's determination that
apartment houses could not be integrated into a residential neighborhood
without destroying "its desirability as a place of detached residences." '
8
Apartment houses were "very near to being nuisances."
19
Modern multiple-family dwellings demonstrate unlimited variations
of the old "apartment house." Smaller buildings, townhouses, and garden
apartments are enjoying increasing popularity. Since it is no longer
possible to view all apartment buildings as restrictively as did the Euclid
Court, it is not valid to exclude all apartment buildings from residential
districts under the Euclid nuisance theory. The PRD concept responds to
these changes by allowing the mixing of single-family and multiple-family
dwellings within the tract area, subject to approval by local planning
officials. Thus, while the PRD adheres to the spirit of Euclid-" rational
relation" and local autonomy-it allows more flexibility in the implemen-
tation of planning needs. This flexibility in mixing of land uses is the
source of friction between proponents of the PRD and proponents of
Euclidean zoning, a friction that reflects fundamentally different perspec-
HARv. L. REv. 1154(1955); Sullivanand Kressel, Twenty Years After-Renewed Significance
of the Comprehensive Plah Requirement, 9 URBAN L. ANNUAL 33 (1975).
15. See note 4 supra.
16. An excellent illustration of the types of apartment buildings built in the 1920's can
be found in 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERiCAN LAND PLANNING LAW, Plate 6 (1975). These
photographs will give the reader insight into the attitude of the Court in Euclid toward
apartment buildings.
17. The Court in Euclid specifically considered the effect of high density housing upon
parking and traffic conditions and upon play areas for children. The Court assumed that all
parking would be curbside. Alternative off-street and basement garage parking was beyond
their thinking. Although their arguments were valid under their definition of apartment
buildings, modern design techniques make it possible to eliminate the objectionable condi-
tions specified by the Court and still permit a variety of housing within the same neighbor-
hood. In fact, under the PRD, newer apartment complex designs generally create more
attractive open spaces for recreation. Cases specifically dealing with apartment houses in
residential districts are: Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120(1925); State exrel.
Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (1927); Downey v. City of
Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); Speroni v. Bd. of Appeals, 368 Ill. 568, 15
N.E.2d 302 (1938). See also Fonoroff, The Relationship of Zoning to Traffic Generators, 20
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 238 (1955).
New approaches to land use intensity are explored from a planner's viewpoint in Hanke,
Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1965).
18. 272 U.S. at 394.
19. Id. at 395.
tives on the organization of society. Euclidean zoning is often employed to
achieve a stratification of people within a community by geographical
regulation of building type, while the PRD allows greater homogeneity and
diversification.
At the heart of the zoning in Euclid was a value judgment that gave
highest priority to protection of detached-dwelling residential areas. In
recognizing local autonomy in zoning, the Supreme Court validated this
judgment. Faced with industrial sprawl that threatened the peace and
comfort of homes and created dangerous, unhealthy living conditions,
localities drafted zoning laws to reflect the American ideal-a single-
family home on an individual lot-by isolating residential areas from
lesser-valued areas. The PRD concept represents a rejection of this ideal.
It should be recognized that the Euclid decision itself did not require
such a restrictive view of apartment houses or adherence to the preservation
of the ideal of a single-family dwelling on a large lot. It did, however,
permit localities to so define the structure of their zoning ordinances, with
the single limitation that the regulation further the general welfare.
Consequently, the pattern that almost universally developed and that is
usually connoted by the term "Euclidean zoning," is that of the single-
family dwelling ideal.
Euclidean zoning actually permits "vertical" mixing of building
types and uses. Districts (or zones) are created on a scale of values-the
highest-valued district usually being restricted to single-family detached
dwellings on a minimum-sized lot. Lesser-valued districts generally permit
all building types and uses of greater value. In other words, uses are
"ranked" and are "cumulative" so that in districts in which lower ranked
uses are permitted, higher ranked uses are also permitted. The result is that
the lowest valued district will theoretically permit mixing of industrial,
commercial, and residential uses, as well as all building types. Of course,
the lowest-valued district's desirability as a residential area is practically
negligible.
In contrast, PRDs permit "llorizontal" mixing of building types and
uses: all building types and uses are on a single plane of value and a
community selects whatever type is suitable for a particular development.
Multiple-family and single-family dwellings, apartment buildings, town-
houses, condominiums, stores, theatres, churches, schools, and other
structures coexist within a PRD. Emphasis is placed upon the needs of the
community and PRD residents, rather than upon the traditional concept of
the "ideal" Euclidean district.
This basic difference in the approach to mixing is the source of
controversy, the PRD offending the Euclidean system on two levels. On
the theoretical level, planned development zoning does not assign values to
building types as does Euclidean zoning; single-family and multiple-
family dwellings are of equal value and utility. On the practical level, when
a PRD is established in an area formerly zoned for single-family resi-
dences, the mixing of building types introduces "forbidden" building
types into the Euclidean highest valued district.20 Fear of erosion of
residential areas through allowance of forbidden uses rallies neighbors to
fight to preserve the status quo. The result of the pressure for maintenance
of traditional zoning and the resistance to PRD zoning has been a highly
structured approach to the use of land based upon community needs
defined fifty years ago. Reverence for old prejudices against all residential
dwellings and uses except detached single-family residences has, in many
instances, created an urban-suburban sprawl as ugly as the industrial
encroachment that was feared in the Village of Euclid. "Cookie-cutter"21
developments represent an orgy of open space consumption without
meeting the housing needs of the total population. This situation ultimately
indicated a need for a new approach to zoning.
III. Need for Change: Zoning for New Lifestyles
The PRD is a response to a recognized need for change in zoning
principles. 22 Euclidean zoning took root in the midst of advancing blight in
rapidly industrializing cities. It provided order and predictablity 23 to
community development and structured use districts according to existing
market demands for the exclusivity of residential areas. But population
demands of urbanizing areas require planning in advance of growth, not
solely in response to already existing blight. 24 This planning must acknow-
ledge that certain segments of the population, notably people under thirty
20. This perspective was noted by Mandelker, a recognized authority on zoning:
The Euclid ordinance gave explicit legal sanction to the hierarchal land use model
...which gives a preferred and protected legal position to single-family develop-
ment. Not only did the Supreme Court borrow explicitly from nuisance analogies in
upholding the zoning ordinance in that case, but it recognized at least implicitly that
zoning distinctions were founded ultimately on taste and value preferences.
D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 33 (1971).
21. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 629, 241 A.2d 81, 83 (1968).
22. The need for change has been recognized by the courts and by zoning experts.
Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968); Chrinko v. South
Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963); Krasnowiecki,
Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki];
Sternlieb, Burchell, Hughes and Listokin, PUD Legislation, 7 URBAN L. ANNUAL 71 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Sternlieb].
23. It cannot be overlooked that the concept of zoning has economic as well as social
motivations. Protection of land values was a major goal. This could be achieved only by
creating a situation in which both rate and direction of community development was relatively
predictable. This realization aids in understanding why zoning challenges always focus upon
the impact of zoning or rezoning upon the market value of the land. Courts were required to
put limits upon the "right" of "predictability" created by zoning. Courts held that zoning was
not a contract between the municipality and the landowner, Clifton Hills Realty Co. v.
Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.2d 993 (1938), and that property owners had no vested
rights in zoning regulations but that their land was held subject to the police power, Eggebeen
v. Sonenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84 (1941). Rezoning is valid if it is not arbitrary or
unreasonable and has been adopted in good faith, State ex rel. Hardy v. Superior Court, 155
Wash. 244, 284 P. 93 (1930). See Annot. 138 A.L.R. 500 (1942).
24. Some allowance for growth planning has been recognized in traditional zoning. See
Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
and over sixty, 25 reject the responsibilities of single-lot-dwelling owner-
ship in favor of residence privileges in an apartment or townhouse with
common ownership of open areas. 26
Although it is possible to achieve varied results through the special
use2 7 and the variance 28 procedures of traditional zoning, the lot-by-lot
exception approach is too restrictive to effectuate any significant changes
or to allow any constructive planning. Flexibility must be built into the
zoning laws as a positive alternative, rather than as a negative exception.
This flexibility is the promise and nemesis of PRDs. The most innovative,
aesthetically pleasing and efficient PRD designs result from tailoring the
development to fit the topography of the particular site and the unique
demands of the community for which it is built.
29
Striking a balance between freedom of design and controlling statu-
tory standards, and between the power of the developer and the discretion
of planning officials, is the key to successful use of planned development
zoning. The gradual process of judicial acceptance of the zoning concept
and careful analysis of its effect upon interested parties have permitted
25. Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3
(1965).
26. Changes in lifestyles and family arrangements since Euclid have changed the
housing market. A growing segment of the population live on fixed incomes-the elderly and
government-subsidized family units. Americans are more mobile, often responding to the
imperatives of the job market and the requirements of large corporations. Single status, late
marriages, childless couples, and cohabitation without marriage have gained increasing
acceptance in our society. All of these factors, combined with the effects of inflation, have
created a demand for housing alternatives to single-lot residential dwellings. Housing that
requires a smaller investment, creates fewer legal obligations, and requires less personal
maintenance is a definite community need. Modern, realistic housing needs are discussed in
South Burlington County v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713 (1975), with
emphasis upon low income groups.
27. I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.18 (1968); 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERI-
CAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 148 (1975). A special use permit allows the establishment of
certain uses in districts where they are normally excluded. Case law is divided between two
theories on the question of special use: (1) The zoning board has wide discretion in granting
special use permits, subject to constitutionally required controlling standards to guide
administrative discretion; (2) When a use is listed as available by special permit, a presump-
tion exists that a special use permit should be granted, in the absence of some strong reason to
the contrary.
28. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 8.17, 8.18 (1968); 5 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 129 (1975). A variance is an "exception device" which
provides for the exception of certain uses from specified restrictions under proscribed
circumstances. The usual standard for granting variances is practical difficulty and unneces-
sary hardship, or simply unnecessary hardship. Evans v. Augusta-Richmond County Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 113 Ga. App. 113, 147 S.E.2d 455 (1966) is a classic case in which denial of a
variance would have allowed zoning restrictions to deprive the owner of all use of the land.
29. Unfortunately, such flexibility can permit an unscrupulous developer to profit at
the expense of the community. High density housing (apartment buildings, townhouses, and
other multi-family structures) and commercial property (stores and shipping centers) allow a
developer to realize a greater investment return, especially if the site is in a highly desirable
neighborhood. If not controlled by locally imposed conditions, a developer could realize a
profit quickly by building high-return structures first and then abandoning the plan. The
community would be forced to zone around the nonconforming structures in order to salvage
the area or to seek some other alternative for completing the plan. Krasnowiecki, supra note
23, at 52; Lloyd, A Developer Looks at.Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3, 10
(1965); Gray v. Trustees, 38 Ohio St. 2d 310, 313 N.E.2d 366 (1974).
formulation of state PRD statutes that go far towards establishing the
necessary balance. 30 To reach this point, the PRD concept was forced to
triumph over the challenges of neighboring landowners as well as those of
arbitrary local zoning officials.
IV. Challenges
A. The Comprehensive Plan Challenge
The planned developments are frequently attacked as invalid aberra-
tions from the comprehensive zoning plan. 31 Under Euclidean zoning a
comprehensive plan provides the substructure upon which the community
development plan is built; it assures a certain predictability in land use and
land value by requiring that all zoning be in accord with predetermined
growth guidelines. It is a check upon preferential zoning that might
otherwise permit a nuisance to develop within a district. A zoning
ordinance that violates the comprehensive plan by creating a small zone of
inconsistent use within a larger zone is commonly designated "spot
zoning." 32 Because spot zoning imposes restrictions upon a small tract of
land not imposed upon the surrounding lands, or grants to it special
privileges not granted generally, it may violate due process and equal
protection rights of either the landowner directly subject to the restrictions
or his neighboring landowners whose property values are adversely
affected. 33 "Property rights should not be divested under the authority of a
municipality's police power, unless by so doing the public health, safety or
welfare would be subserved." 34 If the zoning of a tract is "arbitrary and
unreasonable," 35 bearing no reasonable relationship to the public health,
safety, or welfare, it is invalid.
36
PRDs were attacked on the spot zoning theory in Beall v. Montgom-
ery County Council. 37 Neighboring landowners protested the rezoning of a
43-acre tract from a one-family detached residential zone to a planned
development zone as a violation of the comprehensive plan. Under the
30. Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 241 (1959).
31. See note 14 supra.
32. E.g., Trenton Development Co. v. Village of Trenton, 345 Mich. 353, 357, 75
N.W.2d 814, 816 (1956), ruling that a landowner's rights to due process and equal protection
were violated by arbitrary and unreasonable zoning restrictions placed upon his land-a
'clear case of constitutionally offensive 'spot zoning.' " For a definition of "spot zoning"
and a collection of authorities on the subject, see 58 AM. JUR. ZONING, § 39 (1948) and Penning
v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 367, 65 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1954).
33. Neighboring challenger cases are generally unsuccessful because their property
rights are not directly affected and they have no vested right in the zoning of another's land.
See Krasnowiecki, supra note 22; Smith v. City of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 406 P.2d 545
(1965); Carpionato v. Town Council, 104 R.I. 490, 244 A.2d 861 (1968).
34. Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 731, 12 N.W.2d 387, 390 (1943).
35. Trenton Development Co. v. Village of Trenton, 345 Mich. 353, 357, 75 N.W.2d
814, 816 (1956).
36. Cases are compiled in I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 27 (1974).
37. 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
Maryland Rule38 evidence of a mistake in the original zoning or of a
substantial change in the character of the neighborhood would justify
rezoning. Since no such evidence was presented for the rezoning, the
neighboring landowners argued that it was spot zoning. The court held that
the "change or mistake" rule was not applicable because the County
Council created and added to the Montgomery County Code a new type of
zone that specifically provided for planned developments. The court
recognized that the Code stated the purposes of the new zone and its
relevance to the health, safety, and welfare of the community, and that the
new zone was thus within a comprehensive plan for the community. This
was true even though the specific areas in which the planned development
would be located were not designated on a county map.
39
The court in BeaU admitted that the new zoning provision has "some
of the qualities of a 'floating zone'.' ' Floating zones have been the
subject of litigation with differing results. The question is whether floating
zones permit spot zoning under a more casual definition of the comprehen-
sive plan. The court in Beall, in accord with earlier Maryland decisions,"
accepted the New York Rule,42 which permits floating zones. The New
York test for validity is the intent of the rezoning, not the size of the lot;
43 if
a floating zone is utilized "pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the
general welfare of the community,"' it is valid.
38. The "Maryland Rule" is a judicially created rule dominating Maryland zoning law
that has become the backbone of Maryland's rather unsympathetic attitude toward develop-
ers' claims and its correlative sympathetic attitude toward neighbors' claims. The rule began
in developers' cases from Baltimore City: Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke,
191 Md. 171,60 A.2d743 (1948); Krackev. Weinberg, 197Md. 339,79A.2d387(1951). Under
this doctrine, when there is a challenge to a piecemeal legislative change to the zoning maps
either "up" or "down," Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bailey, 216 Md. 536, 141 A.2d 502 (1958),
such change must be justified affirmatively by a showing of either change or mistake, either
by a confession of error on the previous zoning, or a showing that conditions have changed. 1
N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.06 (1974).
39. Mapping requirements are an attempt to eliminate spot zoning provisions. Rodgers
v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 125, 96 N.E.2d 731, 736 (1951); 1 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 31.02, 26.04 (1974).
40. 240 Md. at 90, 212 A.2d at 758.
A "floating zone" is established in the text of a zoning ordinance but quite consciously
and purposefully not mapped, except on the initiative and application of a potential
developer. Such a zone "is said to float" over the entire area of the district or zone where it
may eventually be established. Bigenho v. Montgomery City Council, 248 Md. 386, 237 A.2d
53 (1968).
41. See Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).
42. The New York Rule is a judicially created test for spot zoning that requires a
balancing of interests-those of the developer who seeks financial gain through the zoning
and those of the community-to determine the intent of the zoning. It is a highly subjective
test, and since it is usually employed in neighbors cases, the neighbors usually win. The
leading case is a New York decision, Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96
N.E.2d 731 (1951). See also Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961);
Palisades Properties Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 207 A.2d 522 (1965); Eden v. Town &
Zoning Comm'n, 139 Conn. 59, 89 A.2d 746 (1952). For neighbors cases in which the
neighbors lost, see Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89,68 A.2d 308(1949); Levinsky v.
Zoning Comm'n, 144 Conn. 117, 127 A.2d 822 (1956); Sears Roebuck Co. v. City of
Alexandria, 155 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 1963) (a developers case with a good summary of the
tests for spot zoning).
43. Lot size was often the basis for finding "spot zoning." See note 32 and accompany-
ing text supra.
44. 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735.
The floating zone was recognized by the Maryland court as a
conscious effort to build flexibility into traditional zoning ordinances:4 5
"[T]he floating zone, which is implemented by legislative action in the
nature of a special exception, is a new concept in zoning and frees the
legislative body from the shackles of the conventional 'Euclidean zone'
fixed as to definite areas.' 6 In doing so, the court initiated a positive trend
toward PRDs. In fact, PRD has thrived in Maryland without specific
mention of the concept in any statewide enabling legislation.47
In Moore v. City of Boulder,48 a decision very similar to Beall, the
comprehensive plan challenge was again put forth by neighboring land-
owners. In issue was the rezoning of 2.1 acres from a single-family
residential to a planned development district. 49 Specifically, the challeng-
ers argued that a state statute50 required that all zoning comply with a
comprehensive plan, and that the city council abused its discretion in
approving the rezoning without a material change in the character of the
neighborhood .51
The Colorado court held that a zoning ordinance providing for a PRD
is a question of "purely local concern" under the Home Rule provisions of
the Colorado Constitution and that any conflict between a local ordinance
and state zoning statutes should be resolved in favor of the local ordinance.
Moore, therefore, is consistent with Euclid's affirmation of local auton-
omy in zoning of specific tracts of land.
The court in Moore denied, as did the court in Beall, that changed
conditions were prerequisite to the establishment of a planned development
district,52 holding that the prime requisite is that the planned development
be compatible with existing zones from which it is carved. Thus, the court
45. Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REV. 105
(1963).
46. 240 Md. at 90, 212 A.2d at 758.
47. Maryland, in essence, has made use of the original provision for alternative zoning
in the standard zoning enabling act, see note 2 supra, without absorbing the prejudice for
"Euclidean zoning." This approach is also used in California and Virginia. Sternlieb, supra
note 22.
48. 29 Colo. App. 313, 484 P.2d 134 (1971).
49. The real issue for neighboring landowners seems to have been the fact that the
rezoning was for the construction of low-income housing. The possibility that residential land
use controls might be exclusionary was recognized at the beginning of American zoning; the
opinions left no doubt that the use of such controls for such purposes was constitutionally
dubious. 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 50.08 (1974); Bjork v. Safford,
333 Ill. 355, 164 N.E. 699 (1928); Village of University Hgts. v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans'
Home, 20 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 560 (1927); State ex rel. Twin
City Building & Investment Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919), rev'd on
rehearing, 176 N.W. 159 (1920) (zoning could exclude poor). It has also been recognized that
PRDs could be used to create exclusive districts within which the affluent could insulate
themselves from the poor and from racial minorities. Mandelker, Reflections on the American
System of Planning Controls, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 98, 99-100 (1965); Rhodes v. Shapiro, 494
S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (condition for PRD approval excluding federally subsidized
housing ruled invalid).
50. C.R.S. 1963, 139-60-1, 139-60-3 (1964).
51. 29 Colo. App. at 255, 484 P.2d at 136.
52. The court discussed the same test for spot zoning governed by the Maryland Rule.
See note 38 supra.
took PRDs out of the context of the Maryland Rule and placed emphasis
upon their value as an advance planning technique rather than a zoning
exception. The council had not abused its discretion because it was reacting
to the community's need for low-income housing and had considered
carefully the impact of rezoning upon the neighboring property. Through
negotiations with the developer, the low-rise units were designed to be of
residential scale and compatible with other multi-family zones in the area.
Moore, like Beall, was actually basing the validity of the rezoning on the
council's intenP3-an intent that was relevant to the health, safety, and
welfare of the community. 
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The comprehensive plan challenge was also raised in Chrinko v.
South Brunswick Township Planning Board,15 a key New Jersey case that
validated non-Euclidean zoning principles. The case, pre-dating the New
Jersey state PRD statute, 56 arose under a local ordinance permitting cluster
and open space zoning. The land in issue was a 235 acre tract approved for
Euclidean subdivision into 526 individual lots. At the time of the subdivi-
sion proposal, local officials questioned the utility of such a development.
South Brunswick Township had been subjected to rapid overdevelopment
due to expansion of the New York City and Philadelphia metropolitan
regions. 5 The township population doubled between 1957 and 1960. A
recently competed Euclidean housing plan, Kendall Park, was a local
disaster-forty per cent of the township population lived in an area slightly
over one mile square. No provision had been made for the additional public
services-schools, fire houses, parks, and municipal buildings-that were
demanded by the urban influx.
Local planning officials decided that the planned development con-
53. The court utilized the test for spot zoning governed by the New York Rule. See note
42 supra.
54. The Colorado legislature removed any doubt as to the validity of PRD zoning by
passing a comprehensive state PRD statute in 1972.
55. 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963).
56. In 1930 New Jersey did adopt Basset's model planning law of 1925 including, with
some alterations, section 12. Most of that section was dropped, however, in 1953. Kras-
nowiecki, supra note 23, at 82 n.86. The provisions of section 12 are described, id. at 79:
Under section 12, the local legislative body could extend to its planning board the
power to approve subdivision plans 'indicating lots where group houses for resi-
dence or apartment houses or local stores and shops are proposed to be built.'
Section 12 went on to make it clear that '[s]uch plan, if approved by the planning
board, shall modify, change or supplement the zoning regulations of the land shown
on the plan.' Two general standards were provided for the guidance of the local
board. First, 'there shall be no greater average density of population or cover of the
land with buildings than is permitted in the district wherein such land lies'; second,
that no such plan shall be approved by the board 'unless in its judgment the
appropriate use of the adjoining land is reasonably safeguarded and such plan is
consistent with public welfare.'
For a discussion of the manner in which section 12 was modified in New Jersey, see id. at 82.
New Jersey enacted a state PRD statute in 1967. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46.55D-1-55-67 (Supp.
1976). Cases of interest are Swimming River Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Borough of New
Shrewsbury, 30 N.J. 132, 152 A.2d 135 (1959) (confusion over power of planning board in
reducing lot size); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957)
(special competence of the planning board in site plan matters affirmed). Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, Kansas, Colorado, and Nevada have enacted similar statutes.
57. Both areas are within a thirty-five mile radius of the township.
cept was a viable zoning alternative, reasonably relevant to the health,
safety, and welfare of the community. These officials implemented the
change through local ordinances under a general grant of power to zone
conferred by the state legislature. 58 Neighboring landowners objected to
the new zoning as an invalid deviation from the comprehensive plan
because it was not specifically authorized by the legislature and was only
for the benefit of one developer. The court affirmed the decision of the
local officials:
Although the state zoning law does not in so many words
empower municipalities to provide an option to developers for
cluster or density zoning, such an ordinance reasonably advances
the legislative purposes of securing open spaces, preventing
overcrowding and undue concentration of population and pro-
moting the general welfare. . . .Such a legislative technique
accomplishes uniformity because the option is open to all
developers within a zoning district, and escapes the vice that it is
compulsory. 9
The court in Chrinko went even further in approving new zoning
techniques. It noted that Euclidean zoning was an "outmoded concept"
because "gradual and controlled development is not practicable in many
municipalities today.' '6 Cluster and open space zoning permitted the
township to control, through negotiation with the developer, the rate of
construction of houses and reserve land for municipal purposes.
The comprehensive plan argument has not been a successful chal-
lenge to PRD zoning. In areas where local officials have seen a need for
zoning alternative to Euclidean zoning and have acted in the best interests
of the community, PRD zoning has been declared valid. PRD zoning is
compatible with a more flexibly defined comprehensive plan, in that it
permits greater local control of land use by ad hominum negotiations with
the developer. Municipal services can be efficiently predetermined, and
public service land use can be integrated within the tract. 61 Moore
demonstrates that zoning concepts can be updated without a radical
revision of present zoning legislation by a redefinition of old terms such as
"comprehensive plan," and a renewed emphasis upon community needs.
But, triumph over the comprehensive plan challenge did not gain accept-
ance for PRDs; other avenues of attack were taken by opponents of this
new zoning concept.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-33 (1967) states that a municipality may
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and sizes of buildings, and other
structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the sizes of yards, courts, and
other open spaces, the density of population and the location and use and extent of
use of buildings and structures and land for trade, industry, residence, or other
purposes.
The statute was enacted pursuant to N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, par. 2 (1971).
59. 77 N.J. Super. at 601, 187 A.2d at 225.
60. Id.
61. 'Many sources cite the good aspects of PRD zoning. Rudderow v. Township
Comm'n, 114 N.J. Super. 104,274 A.2d 854(1971) (excellent summary of literature on PRDs);
Subcommittee on Public Regulation of Land Use, Planned Unit Developments and Floating
Zones, 7 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE& TRUSTJ. 61 (1972); Note, Planned Unit Development, 35
Mo. L. REV. 27 (1970).
B. The Personal Interest Challenge
The heart of challenges by neighboring property owners is not a
respect for traditional zoning, as appears from the comprehensive plan
challenge, but a concern for the value of their own property. Early PRD
challengers asserted that property owners had a right to rely upon existing
zoning regulations and that PRD zoning would adversely affect the
valuation of their property. This is the standard due process argument
advanced in most cases of rezoning, either under PRD legislation or under
"special use" and "variance" provisions in traditional zoning statutes.
Moore considered this argument and rejected its validity in face of the
good-faith actions of the city council. In Orinda Homeowners Committee
v. Board of Supervisors62 the effect of rezoning upon neighboring property
owners gave standing to sue, but was not a basis for relief. The court cited
cases to establish that neighboring owners have "no vested right to
continuity of zoning of the general area in which they reside.' ,63 Further, a
properly designed PRD should be integrated within the community so as to
be an asset and have minimal impact on surrounding land values. There-
fore, the actual legitimacy of this personal interest challenge has not been
demonstrated.
Failing to defeat PRD zoning by attacking the concept as violative of
accepted zoning principles and purposes, challengers turned to the pro-
cedural aspects of implementing the new zoning.
C. Procedural Challenges
The procedural attack was first tried in Millbrae Association for
Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae.' Neighboring property owners
challenged the procedure in the rezoning of fifty-two residential acres to a
planned development. The court held this rezoning valid even though it
was accomplished in small sections over a long period of time rather than as
one tract. The court did rule, however, that after approval of the general
development plan, any substantial changes in site construction would
amount to rezoning the planned development itself. Such changes made
without public hearing or notice would be invalid under the local ordinance
and statute. The court decided that under the local ordinance "the PD
district established constitutes a separate zoning district in addition to the
more conventional types of zoning districts.'"65 Since rezoning is predi-
cated upon local consideration and approval of the construction plan
submitted, substantial unapproved changes would not permit the commun-
ity to determine whether or not the completed PRD is relevant to its best
62. I1 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
63. Robinson v. City of LOs Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 304 P.2d 814, 817
(1956).
64. 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968).
65. Id. at 242-43, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (1968).
interests. The district would, in effect, be rezoned by the developer rather
than the community and would thus be invalid.
The importance of notice by the public to validate the PRD was
reiterated in Chandler v. Kroiss,66 a case involving a PRD that was
authorized under a special use ordinance. The court dismissed procedural
attacks on the distinction between "variance" and "special use," stating
that "[slo long as procedures for securing a permit for a planned unit
development fairly provide for airing the topic,. . .we cannot say that the
concept, as implemented, is impermissible." 67 A companion ordinance
that made approved PRD districts automatic amendments to the com-
prehensive plan had "the same effect as would a succession of variances or
rezonings. "68 Thus, the intent of the rezoning for a planned development
was controlling, and the procedure was valid if it permitted the community
to determine (by notice) the effect of the proposed plan upon its "health,
safety, morals and general welfare. "
69
Procedural attacks can be successful when notice to the public is
insufficient and there is non-compliance with the PRD ordinance but the
remedy may be unsatisfactory. This is illustrated by Frankland v. City of
Lake Oswego,70 in which neighboring landowners successfully challenged
a completed PRD structure as a violation of the planned development
ordinance. Since the completed structure was substantially different from
the structure approved under the ordinance, the building itself was a
violation. A remedy after the damage is done is hardly satisfactory to an
adjoining landowner. In Frankland the court permitted recovery of full
depreciation of the plaintiffs' property, but only such depreciation that
resulted from the difference between the building constructed and the
building represented in the sketches from the approved plan.
In contrast to comprehensive plan and personal interest challenges,
which are aimed at defeating PRDs, procedural challenges to PRD provi-
sions reflect concern over control of the project. Once the planned
development concept was judicially accepted as a valid zoning method and
was permitted by state and local legislation, there was little chance that an
individual could successfully stop a good-faith rezoning of land for PRD.
Only a procedural irregularity that denied notice of the change to neigh-
bors, 7 ' directly violated a statute, 72 or demonstrated a conflict of interest
73
could sustain a successful challenge. Even then, the challenge went to the
66. 291 Minn. 196, 190 N.W.2d 472 (1971).
67. Id. at 476.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 474.
70. 267 Ore. 452, 517 P.2d 1042 (1973).
71. Id.
72. Id.; Rhodes v. Shapiro, 494 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Loveless v. Yantis,
513 P.2d 1023 (Wash. 1973).
73. Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Ass'n v. Township of Dover, 114 N.J. Super.
270, 276 A.2d 156 (1971).
procedure rather than the PRD. A subsequent correction in the procedure
usually permitted the construction of the PRD. In Dover Township
Homeowners and Tenants Association v. Township of Dover74 the court
held a PRD plan invalid because of procedural errors that "could have been
easily avoided." 75 Approval would have been permitted, the court indi-
cated, had a new application been filed. Unfortunately, while the case was
being litigated, local officials repealed the PRD ordinance.
Although some PRD plans have been held procedurally invalid, the
concept of PRDs has successfully met all challenges made against it, a
great accomplishment in view of the PRDs potential to create problems and
its requirement that a myriad of interests be balanced. The purpose of PRDs
is to create flexibility in zoning but such attempts can result in a system of
land use based upon personal interest and favoritism in local government.76
Advocates of PRD zoning recognized from the beginning that procedural
controls would be the key to successful implementation. PRD statutes and
ordinances must allow freedom of design without giving the developer
license to create a community problem by overdeveloping an area. Input
from neighbors and local officials regarding the new zoning must be
permitted without allowing their personal interests to deny the needs of the
community at large. Finally, PRD legislation must protect the rights of
those who will live within the PRD itself. Finding a single solution, a
perfect method of implementing the PRD concept, is a Herculean task. As
the cases indicate, varied approaches have been used with varied results.
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, have ratified the PRD concept by
adopting a state statute, and have affirmed local control by requiring local
enabling ordinances for actual PRD construction approval.
V. The PRD in Pennsylvania
A. Historical Background: Cases Prior to the Statute
In Pennsylvania, as in many other states, only after the court validated
PRDs did the legislature act to further implement the concept. Judicial
acceptance of PRDs was slow in coming. Cheney v. Village 2 at New
Hope, Inc. ,77 was the first Pennsylvania case that explicitly upheld the
validity of PRD regulations, recommending the use of PRDs in Pennsyl-
vania as an alternative to large-lot zoning. 78 Cheney was the culmination of
eight years of inconsistent Pennsylvania zoning reform decisions which
began with Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment7 9 in 1960.
Eves is often cited as the leading case on the comprehensive plan
doctrine. As in other areas of the country, the first cracks in the Euclidean
74. 114 N.J. Super. 270, 276 A.2d 156 (1971).
75. Id. at 161.
76. 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 48.02 (1974).
77. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
78. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
79. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
system were deviations from the comprehensive plan by the creation of
"floating zones." Whereas most courts differentiated between spot zoning
and floating zones, holding that the latter could be a valid zoning tech-
nique, the court in Eves held invalid a floating district for industrial
development as not in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Eves
compared the new provision with spot zoning in producing "relatively
small acreage areas in differently zoned districts; ' 80 the preclusion of
advance designation of future land use denied notice "of the true nature of
his vicinity or its limitations"81 to the property owner and the prospective
property owner. The court in Eves strictly construed the enabling legisla-
tion and the definition of "comprehensive plan," requiring that "the plan,
itself, embodying resolutions of land use and restrictions, must have been
at the point of enactment a final formulation.'" 82 It specifically condemned
analyzing "on a case by case basis for rezoning purposes individual
applications and accompanying technical plans for structure and develop-
ment to determine their suitability.' '83 In effect, the proposed zoning
anticipated planned developments, and the court held all such innovations
invalid without "clear and exact" legislative provision.
Cases subsequent to Eves tempered the decision. Appeal of Key
Realty Co.84 affirmed Eves by characterizing "flexible" or "floating"
zones as quasi-spot zoning, but the definition of comprehensive plan was
liberalized to include "the whole program of land utilization.' '85 The court
in Donahue v. Zoning Board of Adjustments, 6 however, approved a
provision for a floating apartment house district, stating that even though
"the change was made upon request of a particular landowner, this [fact]
does not necessarily create the evils held invalid in Eves. "87 The attempt to
distinguish the cases is unconvincing; the results are contradictory.
Finally, the court in Furness v. Township of Lower Merion,88 in a brief
opinion that does not mention Eves, abandons the rigid insistence upon the
integrity of the comprehensive plan. 89 The court expresses a growing
awareness of a need for innovative zoning techniques to meet the changing
needs of the community: "A Plan cannot remain static and at the same time
be realistic, because the forces of growth, economic conditions, character
and distribution of population and the technique of planning are constantly
in motion."
90
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 11-12.
84. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).
85. Id. at 189.
86. 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
87. Id. at 611.
88. 412 Pa. 404, 194 A.2d 926 (1963).
89. The Furness court made the following comment about the comprehensive plan: "It
is a matter of common sense and reality that a comprehensive plan is not like the law of the
Medes and the Persians; it must be subject to reasonable change from time to time as
conditions in an area or a township or a large neighborhood change." Id. at 927.
90. Id.
The Cheney decision represents a full acceptance of PRD zoning that
provides ad hoc rezoning upon application by an individual developer. The
court in Cheney did not overrule Eves; it distinguished the effects of the
procedures for rezoning. The court declared that "no such 'floating zone'
as existed in Eves exists in the present case"'" because the ordinance
creating a PRD district was "brought to earth" by another ordinance that
amended the borough zoning map and brought the PRD within the
comprehensive plan. 92 Under Donahue the two ordinances are read as
one, 93 and the new zone no longer "floats" over the area. In Eves, no
ordinance was passed to anchor the new zone; the zoning map was simply
amended to show the new area. Later decisions94 considered the effect of a
time lag between passage of an ordinance providing for a new zone and
passage of the "anchoring" ordinance. Eves created judicial suspicion of
floating zones that resulted in an insistence that the zone be quickly
legislated into the comprehensive plan.
Cheney brings into focus more than the viability of PRD zoning as a
necessary alternative to traditional zoning. It emphasizes the importance of
appropriate procedures for implementing positive land use reforms. The
conflict and confusion that exists in these early cases reflects a legitimate
attempt to implement PRD zoning by integrating it with traditional zoning
procedures. The local enabling ordinances that made Village 2 at New
Hope possible were enacted under the general state statutes conferring
zoning authority upon local officials.95 This procedure has a tendency to
open valid zoning to innumerable challenges based upon interpretation of
the state statutes, the extent of power granted to local officials, and the
validity of the procedures they prescribe for approval of planned
developments.
The Pennsylvania legislature, aware of judicial acceptance of PRDs,
adopted a comprehensive PRD statute three months after the Cheney
decision.96 Legislative spoponsorship of planned developments has sub-
stantially quieted the controversy over their validity, but has not guaran-
teed success of the concept.
91. Cheney defined the "evil" of the disputed zoning in Eves:
In Eves, the municipality created a limited industrial district, F-I, which, by explicit
legislative pronouncement, was not to be applied to any particular tract until the
individual land owner requested that his own tract be re-zoned. The obvious evil in
this procedure did notlie in the fact that a limited industrial district might be placed in
an area previously zoned, for example, residential. The evil was the pre-ordained
uncertainty as to where the F-I districts would crop up. The ordinance all but invited
spot zoning ...
429 Pa. at 633, 241 A.2d at 85.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Marino v. Zoning Bd., I Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 116, 274 A.2d 221 (1971).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 48201, 46155, 48207(g), 46601 (1966).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701-12 (1972), enacted July 31, 1968.
B. The Pennsylvania Statute and Judicial Interpretation
The object of the Pennsylvania PRD statut&97 is to create flexibility in
zoning and to achieve a balance of construction control for local officials
and approval certainty for developers that would encourage use of the PRD
concept. It gives the governing body of each municipality the power to
enact local enabling ordinances providing for PRDs. To be valid, the local
ordinances must specify the entity that will administer PRD ordinances, set
forth standards, conditions, and regulations for PRDs, and create a
two-step procedure for tentative and final approval of the plan.
98
This procedure creates an option for local officials who do not want
to make specific provision for planned developments. The provision for
local autonomy in zoning technique is in accord with traditional
approaches to zoning since Euclid. In a 1975 case, Kaufman & Broad, Inc.
v. West Whiteland Township,99 the Commonwealth Court stated: "[I]t
[is] quite clear that the creation of a PRD section in an ordinance is left to
the discretion of the township. PRD provisions are not mandated by the
Municipal Planning Code and no one can compel their enactment." 00 In
Commonwealth v. County of Bucks... the court held that neither the county
planning commissioner nor the county commissioners, as planning agent
or "governing body" at county level, have statutory power to direct local
municipalities to take particular legislative action in planning and zoning
areas. 02 The court, itself, cannot compel municipal authorities to enact
PRD ordinances.' 
03
Once accepted, however, the local PRD ordinance comes under
control of the state statute. Procedures are limited to those provided in the
statute. In Abel v. Township of Middletown104 a township ordinance
mandating approval of a land-use plan as condition precedent to presenta-
tion of an application of a preliminary PRD plan was held invalid. Such a
procedure was an unauthorized expansion of power granted in the Munici-
pal Planning Code, which establishes a two-step procedure for approval of
a PRD. Ordinance provisions that go beyond the authority set forth in
Article VII of the Code are void. 105 The legislative intent of the PRD statute
is to streamline procedures for construction of PRDs, to protect the
interests of the developer and the community. To permit local officials to
97. Municipal Planning Code, Art. VII, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701-12. The
Pennsylvania statute is modeled after Professor Krasnowiecki's proposed legislation. See
Babcock, Krasnowiecki, McBride, The Model Statute, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 140 (1965).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10702 (1972).
99. 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 116, 340 A.2d 909 (1975).
100. Id. at 122, 340 A.2d at 912.
101. 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973).
102. Id. at 298, 302 A.2d at 903.
103. Id.
104. 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 6, 297 A.2d 525 (1972).
105. The court quoted Brazier v. City of Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, 300, 64 A. 508, 509
(1906) as precedent: "It is, of course, beyond all question that, if the statute and the ordinance
are inconsistent, . . . the latter must give way, and the statute only have effect given to it."
Id. at 12, 297 A.2d at 528.
create a complicated multi-level procedure in addition to the Article VII
provisions would defeat that legislative goal.
Local acceptance of the PRD statute obviates the comprehensive plan
challenge'0 6 and makes acceptance of a complying plan nondiscretionary.
In Doran v. Muhlenberg'0 7 a local enabling ordinance was passed under
the state PRD statute permitting planned residential developments within
the local comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. After the developer
submitted a PRD plan in compliance with the state statute and local
ordinance, the township commissioners refused to grant approval.
10 8
When the developer brought suit, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania reversed a lower court decision, holding that the developer had
satisfied the standards for approval contained in the statute and was,
therefore, entitled to approval. 109 The state statute requires that a grant or
denial of tentative approval must set forth "with particularity in what
respects the development plan would or would not be in the public
interest;" 110 it does not make clear the extent of the local board's discretion
in its application of the statutory standards."'I The commissioners disap-
proved the plan because it was inconsistent with the township's com-
prehensive plan 1 2 and because it was not in compliance with requirements
of the township zoning ordinance. In essence, the board attempted to
disapprove of the PRD because it was, in fact, a PRD that by its own
definition, deviated from traditional zoning. The court held that the state
statute requires local PRD enabling ordinances to amend the comprehen-
sive plan; the ordinance and application for approval are not controlled by
the comprehensive plan. The court also held that PRD legislation antici-
pates deviation from traditional zoning ordinances. "It is the very essence
of a PRD that it may diverge from zoning requirements."" 3 The court
would not accept "vague generalities" that the plan was against the public
interest, or that the plan would be visually different from its surrounding
neighborhood. 4 Such reasons were not within the "findings of fact and
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10703 (1972).
107. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973).
108. Doran appealed the board of township commissioners' decision to the Court of
Common Pleas of Berks County, which concluded that the board had not made sufficient
findings of fact as required by section 709 of the Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10709, and remanded the record for this purpose. The board, without receiving
additional evidence, made an amended decision, with additional findings, again denying
tentative approval.
109. Board of Comm'rs. v. Hakim, 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 661,339 A.2d 905 (1975).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10709 (1972).
Ill. Note, Judicial Interpretation of the Planned Unit Development Statute in Pennsyl-
vania, 9 URBAN L. ANNUAL 273, 280 (1975).
112. Specifically, the board included its lack of provision for anticipated traffic conges-
tion and hazards and protection of the "visual enjoyment" of adjacent property owners, its
alleged encroachment on land proposed by township planners for future school use, and
because it would create "an island ... of development substantially different in character
and visible appearance from.the surrounding residential area." 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at
147, 309 A.2d at 453.
113. Id. at 155, 309 A.2d at 457.
114. Id. at 158-59, 309 A.2d at 458.
conclusions" required in the state statute.1 15
The Doran decision is highly favorable to developers as it accords a
presumption of validity to any PRD plan that complies with the state statute
and the local enabling ordinances. This reduces the risk to developers in
utilizing the PRD concept. It does so, however, by removing virtually all
discretionary authority from local officials in approval of PRD plans." 
6
This result is necessitated by the Eves condemnation of case-by-case
consideration that is overcome by the requirement that detailed standards
appear in the PRD ordinance and by the presumption that compliance with
those standards will lead to approval. Conditions can be imposed by local
officials before final approval is granted, but approval cannot be denied
unless "circumstances of a particular matter . . . are so exceptional as to
support the conclusion that the plan in one or more respects, stated 'with
particularity,' would not be in the public interest."' 17
Although the Doran decision grants power to developers, it may
curtail the use of the PRD. Local authorities, deprived of their discretion-
ary approval power, may decide not to pass PRD enabling legislation since
they would be bound by the standards therein. These officials may restore
their own power by returning to conventional zoning techniques that force
developers to apply for exception zoning to utilize the PRD concept.
The dilemma of local authorities in trying to achieve flexibility in
zoning without abrogating as much control as the Pennsylvania PRD
statute requires was successfully resolved by one municipality. In Raum v.
Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township'1 8 the court specifically
approved implementation of innovative zoning techniques outside the state
PRD statute. The township amended its comprehensive plan by creating a
Unified Development District (UDA) that is indistinguishable from a PRD.
The UDA ordinance designates specific areas of the UDA as single-use
districts conforming to the requirements of standard zoning classifications
existing in the township. The developer must comply with the require-
ments of standard zoning districts as well as the additional commitments
made as part of his application for rezoning. The specific requirements
guide local officials in considering further applications by the developer for
approvals within the UDA. By avoiding the state PRD statute, township
officials maintain control. The court in Raum stated: "[T]he Legislature
did not manifest an intent to limit innovations in standard zoning, such as
UDA, by enactment of Article VII."119
Raum affirms local autonomy not only in zoning for specific needs but
also in choice of procedure for implementing zoning techniques. Although
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10709 (1972).
116. Note, Judicial Interpretation of the Planned Unit Development Statute in Pennsyl-
vania, 9 URBAN L. ANNUAL 273, 283 (1975).
117. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 159-60, 309 A.2d at 459.
118. 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 426, 342 A.2d at 450.
119. Id. at 438, 342 A.2d at 456.
it seems to lessen the value of the state PRD statute, it is a reasonable
decision. Since Eves the Pennsylvania courts have attempted to provide for
innovative zoning within traditional zoning procedures. The Board of
Supervisors in Raum exercised all their legally available options to zone
local land according to their needs.
VI. Conclusion
PRD zoning has struggled for the acceptance of courts, legislative
bodies, and planning officials. It is presently recognized as a valid
alternative to Euclidean zoning. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that PRDs will
become commonplace in Pennsylvania communities. Construction of a
PRD is a cooperative effort, requiring agreement between local zoning
officials and a competent developer. Because a PRD is really a "custom
made" development, designed for the unique needs of a particular com-
munity, the developer must have sophisticated landscape design, architect-
ure, and construction resources to create a suitable PRD. Considering that a
developer's prime motivation is profit, this alone, is a forbidding task. A
PRD generally allows no greater profit for a developer than a standard
Euclidean subdivision due to increased plan proposal costs. If local
officials require unreasonable conditions for approval of a PRD, or delay
construction for an unreasonable period of time, the consequential erosion
of profit by costly equipment tie up or other increased expenses may force a
developer to abandon the project. Although a developer may establish his
right to approval under Doran, litigation costs in time and money may also
destroy the profitability of a PRD. Few developers' cases have appeared in
Pennsylvania courts since the enactment of the PRD statute in 1968, and
fewer planned developments have appeared within the state'. This indicates
that developers are opting for standard subdivisions with a relatively
certain profit level and a minimum of local opposition.
Local officials are understandably loathe to relinquish any discretio-
nary authority under Doran. Zoning is a controversial issue and local
officials desire to be able to decide according to local feelings rather than
according to ordinances and statutes. These officials may attempt alterna-
tive procedures for PRD construction, but developers may not find enough
approval guarantees to warrant the expense of a plan proposal. The
Pennsylvania statute and the support of the Pennsylvania courts encourage
PRD zoning, but neither legislative support nor judicial sanction have
made PRDs a practical reality.
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